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In gesprek met Charles Tilly 
Peer Vries en Birgit van den Hoven 
We will focus this interview on your most recent book Coercion, capital and 
European states, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge Mass. en Oxford 1990). The central 
subject of this book is the relationship between on the one hand capital - the 
bourgeoisie - and on the other hand coercion - the coercive power of the state 
apparatus - in the process of state formation. I think everybody will agree that in 
any case during the early modern period this relationship can be described as you 
do as a 'dangerous liaison'. But even dangerous liaisons are liaisons. What exactly 
is the trade-off between capital and coercion? Why do they co-operate? 
Well, each one has an advantage to gain. The warmakers often want to buy the means 
of war and the bourgeoisie are the people who organize the markets, not only for 
soldiers, but also for arms, supplies and the transport of military goods. And because 
they are the professionals in that kind of organizing, they can complement the efforts 
of the people who run the armies. The trade-off for the bourgeoisie is often a good deal 
of profit. After all some of the great mercantile families of Europe made their money 
either by lending to the crown or by engaging in the supply of armies. 
And many of them lost their money in doing so. In the pre-industrial period states 
always were rather voracious and therefore always also a possible threat to 
capitalists.1 But is it not true that after the Industrial Revolution the relationship 
between coercion and capital changed fundamentally and became more of a 
'companionate marriage'? 
Let us first clarify one little confusion here. I regard the state as a synthesis of coercion 
and capital, not just as the locus of coercion. The question I wanted to answer in this 
book and in the work I am still doing, is how the environment in which the state grows 
up affects the kind of state that appears. You have some environments that are, for a 
very long period, very heavy with capital. Places such as Genoa, Venice and the Low 
Countries. There are other places that are very heavy with coercion, not only state-
coercion. One should also think of landlords with their private armies, or bandits. It is 
true that kings grew up to a larger degree out of the ranks of great landlords than they 
did out of the ranks of the merchants. There are relatively few 'merchant-kings'. So 
I agree that there is an affinity between the state and coercion. But all states from a long 
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time ago -1 have been looking at the last 1,000 years - to some degree combined 
coercion and capital in their operation. And to that extent they fused the two from a 
thousand years ago. It is true however that in the nineteenth century things changed 
dramatically throughout most of Europe. 
In my opinion 'capital' then became something completely different. 
Yes. It is very important to recognize, as Marx pointed out, the great increase in fixed 
capital. We go from a period in which circulating capital is a very large part of the 
holdings of the bourgeoisie to a period in which fixed capital in the form of factories, 
tools and so forth, becomes much more important. The state then becomes a kind of 
protector and regulator of fixed capital in a way that very few states were before 1800. 
That is the very reason for my question. I think there is a kind of 'elective affinity' 
between the national state and fixed capital - i.e. industrial capitalism -, but a 
rather tense relationship between circulating capital - i.e. commercial capitalism 
- and the state of the pre-industrial world. Could not critics say that by using one 
word 'capital' for both the industrial and the pre-industrial period, you are 
mixing things up and not really looking at relations between identical variables 
and that the relationship between capital, however defined, and the state changed 
fundamentally during the process of industrialization? 
What can one say except than that this is the case and that there is some kind of historical 
continuity from one form of capital to the other. I agree that there is a break in the history 
of capital at the point when one starts to invest a great deal in fixed industrial plant. 
Because at that point the interests of other parties in the state become quite different. 
Many capitalists who are primarily oriented to fixed capital, now become much more 
concerned to have protectors of fixed locations. It is also true that organized workers 
then acquire an interest in balancing the power of capitalists who control fixed capital, 
and appeal to the state for protection. 
Do you think modern capitalism would have been impossible in a world of city-
states - and empires - and that as economie 'world-centres' Venice, Antwerp, 
Genoa, Amsterdam and London had to be succeeded by national states? 
As I understand it, it would have been extremely difficult to organize the kind of 
employment, production and distribution that grew up in the nineteenth century, with 
the kind of fragmented sovereignty as existed in the city-states. 
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But then how do you explain the paradox, if a paradox it is, that during the 
nineteenth Century the liberal ideology became very populär among the economic 
élites, an ideology which asserts that state-power should be as small as possible, 
while at the same time state-power, at least infrastructural state-power, was 
growing faster than ever before in history?2 
It is a paradox to the extent that the bourgeoisie, that was the primary vehicle of liberal 
philosophy, always had an ambivalent attitude toward the state. They were perfectly 
Willing to accept state protection for their o wn industry, j ust as long as the state did what 
it could to protect their free access to the markets that they preferred. Hobsbawm points 
out the narrowness of actual free trade. They were also perfectly Willing to invoke state 
power to suppress workers. They were not that liberal. What they wanted, was freedom 
to deploy their capital and to seil their products. States indeed expanded enormously 
during the nineteenth Century. And the pressure to expand the state came just as much 
from the European bourgeoisie as it did from the working classes. The working-class 
pressure for state expansion appeared late during that Century and yet states were 
expanding their range of régulations, services and infrastructures from not long after 
the French Revolution. In fact that révolution and the Napoleonic régime provided 
some of the models for the construction of just that kind of a strong infrastructural state. 
If the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution were such fundamental 
turning points, can one still see some continuity between the pre-industrial 
vârieties of the state - the coercion-intensive, the capital-intensive and the 
capitalized-coercive state - and the industrial ones, or do you think that during 
the nineteenth Century all European states took basically the same capitalized-
coercion 'route' in which the old différences disappeared? 
No, there are still important différences. I see the nineteenth Century as a time of 
narrowing of différences as compared with the period from the fourteenth to the 
eighteenth Century. That period I regard as one in which there is a broadening of 
différences among the states that are viable in Europe. Because of the demands of 
nineteenth-century war only some kinds of states were viable in anything but very 
marginal positions. Andorra, Luxemburg, Liechtenstein and the Papal States, for 
example, survived by making special arrangements with their neighbours and essentially 
by declining ail claims to international power. They simply attached themselves in one 
way or another to other states. But with exceptions of that kind, the création of standing 
armies on a large scale, with artillery and a very heavy infrastructure, gave a 
considérable advantage to any state that could conscript its own population and could 
draw on a substantial number of young men. The sheer number of men aged between 
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18 to 25 or so in a country made a significant différence in the nineteenth century to 
the viability of the state, because that viability depended to an important degree on its 
ability to create a standing army. If you think of this coercion-intensive - capital-
intensive range, what happens is that the extremes of that range stop being viable 
except under such specific circumstances as prevailed in Andorra etcetera. The other 
side of this is that of the effect of the French conquests themselves, for example here 
in the Netherlands. A significant part of its relatively centralized state-structure was 
already clearly visible by the 1820s. It came out of the French occupation. 
Do you think the changing character of war and warfare was also the reason that 
in some countries the role of the bourgeoisie was taken over by the state and that 
these countries went through an 'industrialization from above'? Could one for 
example say that in Russia the state had to step in because there was no 
bourgeoisie? 
Russia had some bourgeoisie. Poland, or maybe Hungary, would be a better example. 
And Germany? 
Yes, as referring to Germany, I think that broadly speaking Gerschenkron was right 
in saying that in those later states, that had a large agrarian base, the state did to an 
important degree Substitute for the bourgeoisie that had played a part further west.3 
And in your opinion the reason for that was international military compétition? 
I am suggesting a more indirect connection. What I am suggesting is, that the act of 
creating a standing army, and a state built around it, provided control over pools of 
labour and capital that some states then began to direct toward reinvestment and that 
to that extent what Gerschenkron is talking about, could only happen because a new 
form of state had arisen in Europe. I do not claim that this new form of state arose 
because somebody saw it would have advantages to capitalism. 
Let us return to coercion. One of the basic theses of your book is that states make 
wars and wars make states. On every page you emphasize the importance of 
coercion. But would it not be true to say that from the nineteenth century onwards 
the role of coercion, at least of brute coercion, diminished and something eise took 
its place, or at least supplemented it? 
It may be that because I was looking at a thousand years of history I did two things that 
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make the book slightly misleading. One of them is that I speak very litde about the 
nineteenth Century. But this is the kind of book that is either 10,000 pages or200pages. 
I wanted the whole period to appear in the book. The conséquence is that I pass over 
the nineteenth Century very quickly. The second thing is that I do not provide a very 
füll analysis of a process I think I understand and which by the way is the subject I am 
lecturing on just now. It is clear to me now that from 1750 onwards we are dealing with 
a two-phase process. First one in which building coercive means - that is the création 
of national standing armies - is very important. But once such an army exists, ail parties 
to the state's création have acquired claims to the state, which to some degree they ail 
pursue; peasants, workers, capitalists, petty merchants and so on. To conscript a 
national army agents of the state found themselves making deals over and over again. 
This process of bargaining, which I would describe as 'the création of citizenship', 
gave people a range of claims on the state that no one had ever had in European history 
and thèse then turned the state to non-military activities in a way that had not been 
previously known. 
That must imply that the relative weight of the armed forces in the pre-industrial 
period was bigger than it is during the industrial period. 
Yes, there is no question about that. 
But if that is the case, why then should rulers start bargaining in the nineteenth 
Century in order to acquire relatively less military means than they acquired 
before by means of force? 
Because in total states then started demanding much more of their Citizens than they 
did before. Think about it in terms which are not terribly satisfactory but at least give 
you a metric, that is the proportion of the Gross National Product that the state is taking. 
Partly because capitalism advanced and freed resources that had not previously been 
available, states started drawing 10%, 15% or even more of GNP. 
A bigger proportion than in the pre-industrial period? 
No question about that, redistributing it of course. It was not all spent on the military. 
Let us not get confused. There is an other number here that sometimes confuses this 
discussion, that is the proportion of the state-budget that goes to military expenditure. 
That proportion diminishes. Already by the end of the nineteenth Century social 
services broadly defined are taking more of the budget than the military. That happens 
because of claimants, not because some wise statesman as of 1815 said: ' What we need 
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is a huge state that will build highways, turnpikes, canals, schools and so on and so 
forth'. There were a lot of interests that would now have claims on the states. 
Is there a certain moment in time at which one can pin-point this change, this 
'demilitarization' of the state? 
If we needed dates that you could quote on an examination, we could say that in 
Germany for example it happened from Unification on. In this aspect Germany is a 
wonderful case because, particularly under Bismarck, the state anticipated some of the 
claims, it co-opted and pre-empted them by creating social services and controls, that 
made it more difficult for workers to organize. But surely, in general it would be 
sometime around the middle of the nineteenth century for many European states. 
Do you think nationalism fits into all those developments you just described as an 
autonomous and independent element, or can it simply be 'deduced' from the 
process of state formation? 
I think some of both. I do not think you can strictly deduce the character of nationalism, 
its claims, qualities and myths, from the process of state formation. However, part of 
what we have just been talking about, produced incentives for national claims that had 
not previously existed. The basic question is: 'How did the formation of national 
consolidated states produce a kind of circumscription of a wide variety of resources?'. 
It is really stunning to see how unusual the European state of after 1750 until the recent 
past is in comparison to all the states that have ever existed. Within the same boundaries 
it contained capital, labour, an educational system, a language, a single bureaucracy, 
a fiscal system and a military organization. I think it is important to realize that 
particularly after 1789 to control a state was to control much more than was true before 
1789. The advantages of those who controlled the state, and the disadvantages of those 
who did not, became much greater. 
But then it is something of a miracle that some people wanted to have a state. How 
do you explain that people in parts of Europe, for example Germany, where there 
was no modern national state, wanted such a state so badly. Were they masochists? 
It is not a miracle at all. It became much clearer then that if you had claims, but no state, 
there was a great danger that you would lose those claims. Let us go back another step. 
Until the eighteenth century most states were ruled indirectly. They were ruled via 
great magnates, power holders ofonekindor another, who had great power in their own 
territory, the Junkers for example. Under this indirect rule many different nationalities 
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could survive, even as ül-defined units. Many languages for example could exist side 
by side. As long as rule occurred through the médiation of regional power holders and 
the State did not for example extend its administration to the indi vidual villages, people 
continued to live their lives. 
But still the question remains: ' Why do some people actually want to live in their 
State, with people oftheir nation and only with them? '. Whence came nationalism, 
which is defined by Ernest Gellner as the wish to have a congruency between state 
and nation?4 
I think Ernest Gellner is actually on a very good track on this. It is crucial that there be 
a set of urban people, typically a coalition of bourgeois and intellectuals who already 
have aconsiderable investment in a network of social relations that they have identified 
as a defined common identity. Let us not worry whether it is in fact a common identity. 
A i l they have to do, is to agrée that they have a common origin and that in some broad 
sensé they are kinf olk and have a common culture. To the extent that the people running 
a state do not bother with local affaire, people can continue to hold an important 
position within a network that is defined by kinship, language, religion and so forth 
over a very long period of time. And they do not expérience any great threat to that. 
They can live in more than one culture, speak more than one language and so on. But 
to the extent that there is a competitor for control, particularly of éducation, and to some 
extent religion, administrative language orthe Unes of communication, then the choice 
becomes very clear. There are two ways in which local culture can be threatened. One 
is when those who run the state themselves start imposing a single administrative 
structure on the whole country. They have some incentives fordoing that, it simplifies 
administration, it establishes their hegemony. That is one form of serious threat. It is 
extemal in the sensé that it is 'from above'. The other is that when there are adjacent 
nationalities and one of them allies with the state-builders, while the others do not. 
Then there is a great threat that those who ally with the state-builders will use their 
relations for regional control. That is also an extemal threat, but it is much closer at 
hand. You can see that repeatedly in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
When your neighbour has a state or allies with a state, you have to have one too? 
It is even worse than that. When your neighbour has a state, you may be in it! 
Does this imply that, at least at this stage of history, state formation and nation-
building have become 'necessary'? 
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We can think about this question of necessity in two different ways. One of them is to 
ask: ' Could what now exists, have existed without those previous developments? '. My 
answer would be: There are features of what we now see, and of what we will see in 
1993, that it is almost impossible to imagine happening, if it had not been for the 
existence of heavily capitalized states, of certain kinds of nationalism, and so on. If you 
ask the other type of question, if for example we go back to 1750 and say: 'As things 
were in 1750, was it inévitable that a kind of capitalized-coercive state would become 
the dominant form of state?', I would say: 'No, not at all ' . We can make ourselves a 
hypothesis of a revival of mercenary armies. After all, there were plenty of peripheral 
people the Europeans could have drawn on at that point in the nineteenth Century. 
Why did this possibility not become reality? Why did one not choose this option? 
Well actually some states did. 
The English had a kind of mercenary army, their Indian Army. 
That is right. I made my book very schematic, as if there were no mercenary armies 
after 1815 at ail. But even the Napoleonic armies had their mercenaries, next to the 
national units. We are talking about something that did indeed happen, but the process 
we described squeezed out the mercenaries. First of all the effort of each state 
individually to create its locally recruited army undermines the international recruitment 
of soldiers. 
People were no longer allowed to serve in foreign armies. 
Yes, so the supply ran out. The other point is that the economie advantages of having 
an army you do not have to pay very well and that you recruit on the basis of patriotic 
commitment or something of that kind became obvious. They were, however, not so 
overwhelming that you could not build an army by paying for it. But relatively 
speaking that became a much less attractive alternative. We could re-analyze the 
situation by asking what it would have taken for mercenary armies to have become 
more important. I think we can perform such a thought-experiment. We can change 
some of the characteristics of Europe in the early nineteenth Century. For example we 
can think of employment moving so rapidly that it becomes extremely costly for a 
country to use its own Citizens for military purposes. 
You have written a lot about state formation in Europe, especially in the early 
modern period. Is this because in your opinion there were no states in the rest of 
the world at that time? 
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There was a Chinese state. 
But I do not think one could call 'China' a national state. 
Well, at times you could call it a national state. China is a fascinating case because 
periodically, even before European states tried it, on a scale of Europe - there were 100 
million people living in China in 1500 - the Chinese were trying to build an 
administrative structure that reached into the individual village. We do not yet 
understand the history of China well enough. The fact is that by the criteria we talked 
about, the Chinese had, at a continental scale, something that looked like a national 
state. However, it kept collapsing. 
And why is that? Because there was no fragmented sovereignty in China? In 
reading your book The formation of national states in western Europe I get the 
impression that a very important precondition for state formation in Europe was 
the existence of fragmented sovereignty or feudalism. 
Yes, fragmented sovereignty is a starting point. But I know the people who are working 
on China and I do not think anybody has the answers. One piece of the answer is 
probably that, except for their peculiar relation with the Mongols, the Chinese did not 
face, for 700 years or so, an external military threat. They simply filled the space they 
occupied and worked out a symbiotic, predatory relation with the Mongols on the 
northern border. 
So they did not live in a state system and did not need to build a big army? 
Well, they had an enormous army, but that concentrated on internal control. It showed 
very little external military activity, except on the northern border. That facilitated the 
use of the military force for internal control. 
I suppose that reading your book many historians will say: 'This is going against 
history. The new way of writing history is narrative. The new approach is 
historical anthropology'. What you are doing is completely unmodern. It is 
modern in a post-modern way, but it is unmodern in that is not 'fashionable' 
nowadays for historians to try and write this kind of book. You never really 
analyze 'mentality', you do not discuss intentions and actions. There seems to be 
no room in your work for 'agency'.5 Of course nobody planned the modern state, 
but people were doing things and had intentions by which they brought about 
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something, a state, which maybe they did not plan, but nevertheless produced. 
I think people are planning things ail the time. The misunderstanding is that we 
accomplish the things that we plan. We engage in intentional action ail the time and 
we engage in routine action ail the time. The point is that we have but little capacity 
to foresee the conséquences of our actions, to predict them, as they articulate with the 
actions of a great many other people. It then becomes a fallacy to think that, because 
I had intentions at point A , they must have been, whatever my action, what produced 
the situation at point B. That does not follow at ail. The problem of the relationship 
between structure and agency became more salient as postmodem and literary 
theorizing became more important in historical, sociological and anthropological 
writing and so on. Because, even though part of the impulse of postmodem thinking 
was to unmask agency, its conséquences have often been to explode agency. That is 
a discourse exercises power, but the agent of that power disappears. A number of 
people have actually been drawn in by the idea of social life as discourse, as nothing 
but discourse. And in that sensé the problem of structure and agency has become 
important. That is not the only way, there is the classic way, which is simply saying: 
'To what extent can we think of the présent as an inévitable outgrowth of the récent 
past and to what extent must we invoke some choice, some agency in orderto get from 
the previous arrangement of social life to the présent one?'. That classic problem 
became more salient at the same time, simply because the challenge of post-modem 
thought - about which I am not very enthusiastic - nevertheless came back on those of 
us, who have not been very careful in specifying how we saw the relation between 
structure and agency. 
Many people will say: 'Culture is not a separate phenomenon, culture is 
everything'. Take for example Clifford Geertz...6 
Actually, Geertz is changing his mind about that very rapidly. I think he now feels very 
- guilty to some extent - worried about the next génération of people who are working 
in this line. In an extrême version postmodem thought leads to straightforward 
idealism. I do not hold that position and I think that - as it is practised over the last ten 
years - it is a self-destructive position. But to return to my book, I think it is drenched 
in culture. I deny that it dénies culture. But what it does deny, is that culture or mentality, 
whichever of thèse you choose, is a separate phenomenon from concrète social 
relations. A i l thèse social relations that I describe in the book, between great lords and 
sovereigns, are drenched in culture. But culture is not a separate phenomenon that 
somehow cornes like a beam of light in an Italian Renaissance painting. It does not 
corne from God. 
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But then what is your intellectual 'milieu' at the moment. When I read your work 
and compare it for example to what is happening now in the French Annales, I 
think you do not really affiliate with them. 
Not with what happens now, but you have to remember that as the post-war Annales 
came into being, it was quite a materialist programme. It was only later on that people 
like Furet and Le Roy Ladurie started moving in a much more idealistic direction than 
the 'old' Le Roy Ladurie, Vilar or Braudel. Those people in a very important way were 
materialists. And so was the programme of the Annales for a while. 
Then you refer to the first and second generation. But you do not believe in an idea 
that was basic to their approach: total history. 
I not only do not believe in it, I have a section in one of my recent books that is called: 
'Wi l l total history save us?\ And the answer is: 'No, total history will not save us'.7 
But when I ask you: 'Will anthropology save us?' the answer will also be: 'No!'. 
Then what will save us? Or is there no salvation? 
There is no fïnal salvation, of course, but I do think that, what I would call 'analytic 
historicism', will save us. What I mean by that, is the idea of thinking of the present 
as a product of a past whose elements we can actually detect, but as embodying a series 
of possible futures. Not one future, but a series of possible futures. And the process of 
analysis consists both of seeing how the previous history of a social process constrains 
what possibilities are open at the present and of analyzing how people make the choices 
that produce the next phase in that social process. What it requires, is laying out the 
other possibilities at any gi ven point in time and then doing an analysis of what it is that 
produced the choices that were made. That is the first thing. The second thing it 
requires, is actually taking cases and showing how the previous histories of the actors 
and social relations involved in those cases, constrained them at each point in time. 
Think of the history of a state as a whole set of social relations that exist at a gi ven point 
in time which constrain what can happen. What I do in that last book, is to greatly 
simplify that with this coercion-capital scheme. In a sense I try to systematize some 
insights that were already in Barrington Moore's book.8 To be tied to great landlords, 
is to be tied to much more than the fact that they had military force at their disposal. 
There is a way of life involved. This is a historicist way of thinking, in that is says that 
when and in what order something happens, significantly affects how it happens. 
That is a much more analytical point of view than for example Hobsbawm has 
in his last book. Would you ever write a book like that one?9 
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Well, first of all, I guess I have to say something that many of the reviewers say. Eric 
is so hostile to every national movement, that he has great difficulry ever portraying 
how it is that anybody could ever have had such a foolish idea. I am seriously worried 
about the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, it seems to me that you can easily place yourself 
in the position of the Estonians and see what it is about being an Estonian that makes 
independence frorn the Soviet Union attractive. But Eric finds that, not only in his 
book, very difficult. That does not mean he is not good at it. Part of the book on 
nationalism goes back to the book he did with Terence Ranger and Nationalism is 
wonderful in that regard.10 There are wonderful ironies in it. The Rumanians, inventing 
their Román origin for themselves and a single language, a literature and so on. And 
then others do the same sort of thing. There is a wonderful invention of tradition. 
There is one element, let us cali it empathy. To be the historian of a phenomenon, 
you do not have to like that phenomenon, you can hate it. But at some point you will 
do a better job if you can think yourself into the position of the people who did 
something and sort of reconstruct the circumstances that make this a plausible 
outcome. And I do not think Eric ever does that. If you knew nothing about the topic 
and read the book, you are bound to say: "This is a book about human folly. People keep 
doing the same foolish thing over and over again'. What is it in this book that explains 
why they ever did it? The book is perfectly consistent with his, what he calis, paleo-
marxism. He sometimes says he is the only paleo-marxist left. He actually does a 
reasonable job at the beginning of the book laying out different positions on the 
national question within Marxist thought and he takes one of the positions, that says, 
this is a political aberration, based on misunderstandings. There is no justification for 
it. 
Would you write a book like this about such a subject? 
I enormously admire Eric Hobsbawm. He is one of my intellectual héroes. I love the 
talent that he put into that book. If I could find the exact story the way he does each time, 
I would be absolutely delighted. But he has not consrructed the book the way I would 
write it. It is surprising, that for example having read Gellner, he does not provide a 
clear discussion of how the changes in the character of the state affected the viability 
of different forms of nationalism. 
I think the biggest part of the book is rather idealistic. There is not much 
discussion of social-economic change in it. It is kind of traditional. 
It is. It may be the most traditional book that he has ever written. That is probably a 
product of the way the book carne into being, as a series of public lectures. But it is quite 
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trae that there is no economic frame in the book. You do not understand how the 
changing forms of capitalism and then of socialism affect the viability of different 
forms of nationalism. It is not a very analytical book. Both sides, the economic and the 
political side, are surprising. The economic side is surprising, because it is Hobsbawm 
and he has written brillianfly on related topics in his books on the nineteenth century. 
The political side is surprising, because there are a number of efforts - think of Anthony 
Smith" - which have a political analysis which you might have thought Hobsbawm 
would disagree with in one way or another, but at least attend to. His book becomes 
something more of an exhibit of the crazy ideas people have had about nationalism. 
But it is a beautiful exhibit. It is a much less theoretical book, implicitly, than 
Hobsbawm's other books. He has always hated being very explicit about his theories. 
He does not like sociology. 
In a way. He does not like people to lay out hypothesises and so forth and say, here is 
my evidence. He prefers anotherform. Al l of his books in that sense are more narrative 
than anything I would ever write. I think that is simply a difference in training and 
temperament. I prefer to have a book whose argument you could write on a single page. 
It might take you a book to make that argument plausible, but I would regard any book 
of mine as a failure if I could not write its argument on a single page. 
Again, that is completely against the new developments in history, I think. At least 
in the Netherlands, in France, Engiand, Germany, as far as I can see in Spain, 
history is developing into a kind of un-analytical, anti-analytical literature. 
I can not help thinking that, to the extent that this is tied to a relativist or completely 
negative epistemology, it is a self-defeating enterprise. What worries me, is that there 
is a generation of people who will have committed themselves to that enterprise. And 
those people will have systematically unfitted themselves to do anything else. 
An inevitable final question on the eve of 1992. Do you think the state will 
disappear ? You say that the state has not only a basis in discourse, but also and 
especially an objective, material basis. So you could imagine it disappearing? 
As a matter offact I think the national state is on its way out right now. The European 
Community is going to be the first to destroy it. If the charter of labour actually is 
implemented and a comparable free movement of capital occurs, it will be impossible 
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for any single state after the year 2000 to maintain a separate army, a distinct social 
policy or a fiscal System which is autonomous. We already recognize that there can not 
be a separate monetary System. There will be no way to maintain a welfare system at 
a national level, unless it is a replica of the welfare Systems in all of the European 
countries. That is my sense of it. I may well be wrong, but if I am wrong, then that last 
book is wrong. It is probably wrong in most ways, but we hope it is right in a few useful 
ways. I did not get into it this way, but I realized that, as I started thinking through the 
conséquences of the European Community, I have very little choice but to conclude 
that the economie arrangements that the twel ve have chosen to concentrate on, actually 
undermine the political arrangements that they think that they have avoided. As 
compared with the vision that a Monnet had of the European Community, which 
actually had a great deal of political unification into it, the state représentatives to the 
European Community have been very, very hésitant to anything about dissolving 
political sovereignty. 
You think material forces will prevail and décide the fate of the sovereign national 
state? 
A l l I am saying is, that if the kind of argument that I offer in the coercion-capital book 
is correct, then it also ought to be true that free movement of labour from one part of 
Europe to another, even assuming that the Community can actually seal the eastem and 
southern border - which I think is very unlikely - is going to mean that the high 
productivity points in Europe are going to attract labour from the low productivity 
points in all of a circumscribed area. They are going to send remittances in small 
packets, but great remittances. As cyclical unemployment strikes any of these high 
intensity centres, the costs of maintaining unemployed labour are going to become 
enormous. No single state, as they now exist, will be able to carry those costs. Or if they 
do this, they will start negotiating in a way that will almost certainly tend to equalize 
policies and costs among states. Which means you have either enormously complex 
transfer Systems or restrictions on the movement of labour. If the free movement of 
labour continues, I do not think military conscription will be possible on a national 
scale anymore. So national conscripted armies disappear, at least become extremely 
difficult to manage. The welfare budgets are going to be a very large part of state 
budgets. I think a confédéral System of some kind could come out of it. But almost 
certainly a number of these acti vities that now provide the organizational basis of state-
existence, including that circumscription I was talking about earlier, are under a 
tremendous threat. And that is just talking about what the European Community is 
doing itself. At the same time the international mobility of capital is accelerating to a 
degree that already greatly diminishes the power of any particular state to regulate the 
investment or reinvestment of capital during some time. 
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You are referring to the situation in Western Europe. But how about the eastern 
parts of Europe? There we see not only the disintegration of existing states, but 
also the wish to create many new ones instead. Is not that a development in the 
opposite direction? 
Think first about the entry costs for fully equipping your own state in the European 
world of today. At most four of the Soviet republics are in the position to supply those 
entry costs. I think with the assistance of Sweden, Finland and western European 
countries you could probably maintain a separate Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. I do 
not think Georgia, Azerbaidzjan, Armenia, have an independent future. There are a lot 
of candidates. One of the problems with the Soviet Union is the same kind of spiraling 
process we were talking about earlier. The linguistic maps have about two thousand 
units on them. And each unit that acquires autonomy threatens the next unit in some 
way. So, there is a limit. You could chip off a few, possibly the Ukraine, And apart from 
these ' internal ' problems there are very strong international resistances to the changing 
of boundaries. It is really surprising how strongly the collective state-system has come 
to resist shifts of boundaries. 
The map is fixed, except for the German re-unification. 
There have been very few partitions. I think India is the most notable example. As a 
matter of fact there are very few nation-states. Actually, Hobsbawm in his book is very 
good on the question: 'Are there really any nation-states?'. 
Anthony Smith says that only some ten percent of all national states in the world 
actually are nation-states.12 
It is extremely difficult for any state to maintain itself without a minimum investment 
in infrastructure. That really is a serious problem for 'new states', particularly in 
Europe where the pressures from other states to provide state services, state benefits 
etcetera are pretty substantial, much greater than they are in Africa. 
So if new national-states will arise, they will probably not be really 'sovereign' 
national-states? You have to be involved in an international system from the 
beginning. You can see it in Spain where many people in Catalonia want to be 
autonomous, but only when they are more or less incorporated in an internatio-
nal system as the EC. They feel that they are too small for complete sovereignty. 
To come back to the example of the Soviet Union, I do not think for example that in 
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general the Soviet republics are viable states. Obviously the Russian Republic is huge, 
populous, relatively rich on a world scale. But the other republics by and large are not 
viable. Particularly if they are going to create the full apparatus of a national state. On 
the other hand, I think it is quite possible, when some of the same things are going to 
happen in eastern Europe that have happened in the European Community: attempts 
to create economie bloes of one kind or another, large markets and so on. And those 
in some ways will make political autonomies that do not have all these other powers, 
more viable. But I could well imagine a return to the normal state of the world, which 
is to have thousands and thousands of small entities. 
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